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Abstract 
Self-disorders (SDs) (from the German Ichstörungen) are alterations of the first-person 
perspective, long associated with schizophrenia, particularly in early phases. Although 
psychopathological features of SDs continue to be studied, their neurobiological 
underpinnings are unknown, This makes it difficult to integrate SDs into contemporary 
models of psychosis. 
The present review aims to address this issue, starting from an historical excursus 
revealing an interconnection between neuroscientific models and the origin of the 
psychopathological concept of SDs. Subsequently, the more recent neurobiological 





Self-disorders (SDs) are disturbances of “basic-self” (a “pre-reflective” sense of first-
person perspective)1,2. They are characteristic features of the schizophrenic spectrum 
disorders, often preceding the onset of full-blown psychosis. SDs manifest as a variety of 
anomalous subjective experiences including depersonalization, diminished sense of 
existing as bodily subject, distortions of first-person perspective, reduced sense of 
coherence in fundamental features of self (e.g., sense of anonymity, identity confusion, 
etc.), and disturbed self-other/self-world boundaries3. Recent evidence suggests that SDs 
are core phenomena of schizophrenia4. In subjects experiencing first episode psychosis, 
SDs are associated with schizophrenia as opposed to affective psychoses4, greater 
symptom severity, neuropsychological impairment6, poor treatment compliance and 
clinical outcome5. In people at Ultra High Risk for psychosis (UHR), the SDs are 
associated with increased risk for transition to psychosis7. Despite the clinical importance 
of SDs, their neurobiological underpinnings are unknown, limiting their integration in 
contemporary models of psychosis, which have a major neurobiological component. This 
review aims to address this issue. We offer an historical perspective revealing that SDs 
and neuroscientific models of schizophrenia have been interrelated since their original 
conceptualization. We then examine the evidence linking SDs with contemporary models 
of the early phase of schizophrenia. 
Historical Definition of SDs 
The origin of the SDs term is sometimes attributed to Jaspers. Although Jaspers (1913)8 
describes phenomena related to SDs, e.g., passivity experiences, being “influenced,” 
inserted/withdrawn thoughts, etc., he did not systemize them under the SDs-concept. The 
SDs-concept was rather developed by Jaspers’ Heidelberg colleagues (Gruhle, Mayer-
Gross, Beringer). For the first time as far as we know, we report: (1) the role of Jaspers’ 
Heidelberg colleagues (the early Heidelberg School) in the origin and development of the 
SDs; (2) Gruhle’s (1915)9 coining the term SDs: “Although I found the experience 
frequently described, it was never captured by its own term…Tentatively, I call this 
passivity - the nonparticipation in one’s own experience - a self-disorder…”(our 
translation).  
Self-disorders as Aberrant Salience: The Heidelberg Psychotomimetic Mescaline 
Study 
The Heidelberg Psychotomimetic Mescaline Study 
The development of the SDs-concept was associated with a pivotal study10-12 by the 
Heidelberg school in the 1920s concerning the psychotomimetic effects of mescaline in 
modeling SDs. Beringer10-13 injected mescaline hydrochloride intramuscularly to 
phenomenologically study  “the structure” of healthy individuals’ subjective experience 
of the psychotomimetic SDs, thus paving the way for hypotheses about neurocognitive 
mechanisms. The results indicated that SDs involve disruption of embodied perceptual 
experience, which affects the experience of time, space and continuity of self-experience 
(see Table 1).  
[Place Table 1 about here] 
Mescaline, SDs and automatic processing 
These studies supported Gruhle’s14,15 observation that perceptions, movements and 
hallucinations are experienced in SDs as having independence from self (ich-
unabhängig10). Perceiving, moving, speaking, thinking, willing are normally supported by 
automatic processes. With SDs, the patient experiences these automatic processes as 
independent “automatisms” having foreign agency. This is consistent with the hypotheses 
that SDs have common neurobiological mechanisms and the notion that SDs are 
disturbances of the relationship of self to its own processing14-17. 
Mescaline, SDs and thought disturbances 
Mayer-Gross, a participant in the mescaline studies, observed that hallucinations and the 
“made” thoughts, etc., have a common component: it is not that thoughts are ascribed to 
alien agency, they are “perceived” as alien. The suggestion is that for subjects with SDs, 
thinking is experienced as sensory, as in thoughts that are audible to the subject 
(Gedankenlautwerden) and auditory verbal hallucinations (thought to be derived from 
inner speech). Mayer-Gross16,17 described “a making sensual (Versinnlichung)” in the 
“sensory representation of thoughts…Without this change, the manifestations remain 
inexplicable.” By observing subtle self-perceived cognitive and other disturbances in 
prodromal schizophrenia and in mescaline intoxication, Mayer-Gross17 “anticipated” 
Huber’s basic-symptoms concept18.Because basic-symptoms are subtle, subclinical 
disturbances experienced as arising from oneself, they do not overlap with SDs, which, 
are perceived, by definition, as happening to self, without the self’s participation.9-12,14-17 
Nevertheless, mescaline models both the earlier self-perceived subtle cognitive-
difficulties (Denkerschwerung) and, at higher doses, their transition to thoughts becoming 
sensory in the SDs leading to experiences of thought-insertion/withdrawal/broadcasting, 
etc.10-12,16,17   
SDs as primary symptoms  
In the 20’s and early 30’s, Gruhle and Mayer-Gross, further developed the SDs-concept 
by proposing that SDs were among the primary symptoms of early schizophrenia (in 
Jaspers’ sense)14-17. As the other primary symptoms, SDs are “nonunderstandable in 
terms of their historical-cultural context and the person’s biography (or motivations) 
because the underlying neurobiological process has interrupted the person’s 
development…Something new (unprecedented, non derivable) must be present.”19 
It was only later that Kurt Schneider20, who in 1946 became Director of the Heidelberg 
Psychiatric Clinic, further systemized the phenomenology of SDs in schizophrenia, which 
he included among its first rank symptoms. 
SDs and aberrant salience in early psychosis 
Gruhle and Mayer-Gross maintained that SDs involve the interruption of the 
understandable context or inner-connectedness of experience. This is in line with 
Hemsley’s21 hypothesis that cognitive disturbances in schizophrenia involve a change in 
the way stored material is integrated with sensory input. A failure to relate sensory input 
to a contextually appropriate frame of reference would lead to faulty or absent 
expectation and thus to inappropriate allocation of attention to details of the environment 
not normally reaching awareness (what today is called aberrant salience). As Jaspers’ 
primary delusions8,19, the SDs are “nonunderstandable” for the interviewing clinician, but 
–unlike primary delusions- they are also nonunderstandable for the patient14-17. Inserted 
thoughts, for example, concern harmless, mundane circumstances. Yet, the patient knows 
precisely which thoughts are inserted, e.g., the thought to go to a concert is suddenly 
experienced as foreign14,15. 
Similarly to the aberrant salience thought to underlie prodromal delusional mood,19 SDs 
disrupt the on-line contribution from past experience in shaping the inner-continuity of 
consciousness. Previous learning is experienced as irrelevant thus disrupting context.19,21 
Seeming to come from “nowhere,” the made-experiences, withdrawn thoughts or other 
SDs-symptoms disrupt “the inner-connectedness of current concerns,”14 (i.e., goal-
processing). The patient himself/herself is surprised.14-17 This process suggests an 
analogy with what in more recent accounts is called a prediction-error signal in Bayesian-
modeling22. Due to the ongoing “interruption” by the made or influenced perceptions, 
movements, thoughts, etc., there is a reduction of what the patient expects or anticipates 
(das Vorschauende) from moment to moment;16,17 there is only the compelling sensory-
evidence of now (aberrant salience): “no temporal order prevails, each sensory 
impression is equally valued, replacing its predecessor”16. The experience is new and 
compelling and the patient’s autobiographical past seems irrelevant.14,15,19 Moreover, the 
prediction-error disrupts the event encoding of autobiographical memories into coherent 
self-experience (reviewed in19). In summary, the early Heidelberg account is compatible 
with later Bayesian modeling: SDs occur across different modalities (perceptual, motor, 
sensorimotor, volition, memories, thoughts) suggesting that a common mechanism, 
(prediction error in current terminology) applies to each modality. 
 
Neurobiological/Neurocognitive models of dysfunction implicated in SDs  
Self-monitoring models 
A failure to recognize stimuli as self-generated might result in the inability to ignore 
irrelevant stimuli, causing the misattribution of self-generated processes to other agents23. 
Different brain areas have been implicated as playing a key role in self-monitoring, 
reviewed as follows. 
 
Self-referential processing 
Self-referential processing regards stimuli that are experienced as strongly related to one 
own’s person24. There is evidence that cortical midline structures (CMS), including the 
medial prefrontal cortex, the anterior and posterior cingulate cortices and the precuneus 
are important for self-referential processing24 and increasingly activated during tasks 
requiring judgments about the self-relevance of stimuli, independently from the nature of 
the stimulus or sensory modality. Together with inferior parietal and lateral temporal 
areas, the CMS comprise part of the “default-mode network”, deactivated during 
engagement in non self-referential tasks (e.g., focal-cognitive/executive tasks) and are 
active during resting or baseline conditions24. Since this network plays a so-called pre-
reflective role during tasks requiring active reflection of self24, it is thought to mirror the 
pre-reflective basic-self as a unified, stable perspective of the subject in relation to the 
environment, altered in SDs. Furthermore, CMS engagement across different stimuli 
modalities is in line with the hypothesis14-17 that SDs have common neurobiological 
mechanisms across the modalities of perceiving, acting, thinking, willing. The CMS 
(together with insula25) are involved in assigning first-person perspective26 and contribute 
to form the sense of basic-self as “subject and agent of perception”, as opposed to self as 
“object of attribution”27. Moreover, CMS are involved in self-representation in the past, 
future and present24, suggesting their role in maintaining the temporal continuity(cf.14-17) 
and uniqueness of basic-self. Dysfunctions in CMS may result in SDs, hyperreflexivity, 
increases in self-focus, self-other boundary confusion and passivity phenomena.  
 
Sensorimotor integration (forward model deficit) 
Other authors propose that CMS and default mode network are not specific to pre-
reflective sense of self, but rather associated with general cognitive functions involved in 
inferential processing and memory-retrieval28. Specifically, they argue that the self-
specific first-person perspective altered in SDs is anchored in sensorimotor integration. 
According to Frith23, commentaries by29,30, an efference copy of the action is matched 
with feedback from the action actually made, creating sense of ownership. A copy of the 
intention to act is sent as feed forward information to a comparator: a match with the 
occurrence of the action generates sense of agency. Forward-models predict and dampen 
the perception of planned actions, allowing discrimination of self- from non–self-
generated actions, thus contributing to sense of agency A recent fMRI study confirmed 
that patients with schizophrenia seem unable to predict and suppress the sensory 
consequences of their actions.31 Hauser and colleagues demonstrated that altered sense of 
agency linked to abnormal sensorimotor predictions is already present in UHR subjects32. 
Other authors propose that the sensorimotor integration model could be extended to 
encompass other domains including mental actions (emotions and thoughts).27 In early 
schizophrenia, delusions of control may derive from misattribution of self-generated 
movements, emotions, thoughts as externally generated, resulting from a dysfunctional 
forward-model mechanism23, involving disconnectivity between motor and sensory 
cortices33. Somatosensory related areas (postcentral gyrus, insula, temporo-parietal-
junction), and anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortex are crucial for the sense of being an 
embodied subject24, via their interactions with key motivational and limbic areas such as 
the ventral striatum and amygdala. In early schizophrenia, impaired prediction (in 
sensorimotor, emotional, perceptual, thought domains) would undermine sense of 
ownership and agency for both mental content and actions. For example, corollary 
discharge issuing from frontal areas where thoughts are generated would fail to alert 
auditory cortex that the thoughts are self-generated, leading to SDs involving sense of 
agency and ownership, the misattribution of inner speech to external sources, hearing 
one’s thoughts spoken aloud and auditory hallucinations34. 
 
Salience models 
Bayes' theorem proposes that our expectations determine how we interpret new evidence. 
Conversely, subjective beliefs are updated accounting for the new evidence. Violation of 
expectations (prediction errors) makes an event attention grabbing, i.e., more salient. If 
prediction error does not fit the knowledge based on previous experience, a new inference 
occurs22. The following models suggest that the dysfunction in the capacity to compare 
predicted and incoming stimuli, and thus to adequately interpret the experience may be 
related to dysfunctional salience processing and therefore contribute to SDs. 
Novelty and motivational Salience  
Subcortical dopamine release from Ventral Tegmental Area occurs when a novel 
stimulus is experienced, signaling salience, orienting attention and motivating 
behaviour35. The novelty signal is thought to arise in the hippocampus36, which may act 
as “comparator”, vital to the inner-continuity of consciousness in terms of prediction 
from past experience21. This process is also important for the formation of episodic long-
term memories for novel events36. Aside from novelty processing, the attribution of 
salience to environmental stimuli is important to motivate behaviour in relation to reward. 
For example, incentive salience is a psychological process that modifies the perception of 
stimuli, imbuing them with salience, making them attractive37. Neurobiological 
alterations of salience attribution may lead to faulty, or reduced expectations, resulting in 
difficult integration between actual situation and one’s prediction. When mismatch 
occurs, innocuous environmental stimuli motivate attentional orientation due to 
dysregulated striatal dopamine and prediction error signaling.38 Attention is allocated to 
stimuli, which otherwise go unnoticed, leading in turn to an excessive awareness of 
stimuli. This disruption of the tacit structure of normal experience may account for 
hyperreflexivity, labeled as integral to the SDs, introducing awkward rigidity, slowness, 
and sense of perplexity in the person's interactions with world3,4. 
This model may account for the ability to automatically grasp the significance of an event, 
action or sentence given its social context. In fact, evidence from animal and human 
studies suggests that the neural circuit involved in the learning and memory processes 
that enable context-dependent behaviour includes the hippocampus, amygdala, medial 
prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum38,39,40. The implicit “grip” of the “rules of the game” 
or “common sense”2,19,41,42, includes a sense of the situationally appropriate. Disruption 
of one's “grasp” of the field of awareness may occur with hyperreflexivity and 
diminished self-experience, thought to be fundamental to SDs2. 
Aberrant salience 
The aberrant salience model of psychosis mostly implicates a corticostriatal network 
comprising the midbrain, basal ganglia, lateral medial-temporal, and prefrontal cortex35. 
Disruption of dopamine’s role in learning relevant associations and updating inferences 
and beliefs about the world could result in delusion formation/positive symptoms22. 
Salience attribution has been studied in patients with early psychosis at both behavioral 
and neural levels using reward-learning tasks. The inability to distinguish between 
relevant and irrelevant stimuli in early schizophrenia may result in an alteration of how 
objects and meanings emerge from background context. The ability to recollect the past, 
interpret the present and anticipate the future is disrupted. Consequences of that may be 
the SDs, a loss of “common sense”, and hyper-reflexivity.  
[Place Table 2 about here] 
Conclusions and implications for early schizophrenia 
 
A model integrating phenomenological, neurocognitive and neurobiological aspects of 
SDs is likely to improve our understanding of the mechanisms that underlie early 
schizophrenia. Conceptually, the neurochemical and neurofunctional alterations observed 
in UHR and first episode subjects could be better associated with their subjective inner-
world and feelings. On the diagnostic/prognostic side, it may support risk stratification 
and individualized focused interventions in early psychosis. Among anomalous 
experiences in UHR, SDs have high specificity for the schizophrenic spectrum7. Unlike 
attenuated positive symptoms, which have no prognostic significance, SDs (particularly 
passivity phenomena43) seem to have convincing predictive power7 of conversion to 
schizophrenia. If results are replicated, SDs assessment could be used by on-going 
international early psychosis projects (e.g. PRONIA, PSYSCAN) that are developing 
translational diagnostic and prognostic tools by integrating psychopathology and 
neuroscience modalities.  Finally, a comprehensive model combining neuroscience and 
SDs could create an experimental platform for the development and assessment of novel 
treatments targeting SDs in early psychosis. 
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